This work presents a north-south endogenous-growth model that reproduces some recent EU stylized facts: convergence between countries, divergence within the same countries, more spatial concentration of economic activity and higher growth rates.
results as a key to select between competing economic theories concerning EU stylized facts. Which were these alternative theories?
First, neoclassical (exogenous-growth) models imply that the local steady-state relative positions depend on microeconomic features, una¤ected by current levels of cumulative factors. Therefore, policies aimed at an even distribution of cumulative stocks are irrelevant in the long run.
1 On the other hand, divergence-models 2 allow for agglomeration externalities, which make initial cumulative stocks really crucial with respect to the relative position of steady states. As a consequence, policy is extremely relevant, and in the dynamic (endogenous-growth) models a trade-o¤ arises between regional cohesion and global growth rates. Consequently, Boldrin and Canova's …ndings seemed to support neoclassical models, typically associated with less activist regional policies, at the expense of the case for divergence models.
In our work we try to emphasize two ideas related to that controversy: …rst, available empirical evidence does not exclude any theoretical paradigm; second, and more importantly, maybe the whole dilemma between both paradigms is not the right discussion.
Why not? As J. S. Pischke noted in a comment to Boldrin and Canova (2001) , decreasing return structures and local agglomeration nodes may be alternating; not only in time f or a given place; but also in space f or a given period of time. In that case, it may be interesting to consider some duality in the regional production functions within countries, unlike the usual practice followed in both neoclassical and divergence models.
Certainly, both paradigms exhibit symmetry in local production functions but for the initial stocks of capital and public knowledge. However, recent growth-accounting exercises 3 detect fast convergence rates towards rather diverse steady states, emphasizing sectoral specialization and TFP di¤erences as crucial elements that keep local steady-states apart. We have exploited that image of dually-structured countries to construct a model that respects Boldrin and Canova's …ndings. Moreover, our model reproduces some recent EU stylized facts: international convergence trends accompanied by regional divergence within the same countries.
host local agglomeration economies, and a periphery doomed to host just primary sectors under perfect competition. We assume that international-trade barriers for our homogeneous good do not decay at the same pace of those for manufactures, as if biased technological changes a¤ected di¤er-ently the transaction costs of both sectors 5 . Under some conditions, since the northern aggregate income is larger, a marginal increase in trade openness for manufactures induces a net in ‡ow of demand for southern manufactures: this raises the relative wage of the core with respect to the north.
Simultaneously, the relative wage of the core with respect to the periphery also increases, since primary goods remain barely as attractive to foreign consumers as before. Then, these widening income di¤erentials within the south give rise to migrations, which also enhances peripheral wages and favors north-south convergence (reproducing our stylized facts).
Concerning a growth evaluation, such an agglomeration of labor force in the core turns out to be bene…cial for the growth rate of the global economy. In our framework (based in Grossman and Helpman (91)) imitation and innovation are complementary activities. Therefore, given that some of the new immigrants in the core will undertake research activities, they will enlarge the southern catch-up potential and the growth rate of the global economy. The last e¤ect holds because a stronger imitation will reduce northern wages and increase the value of a patent, raising the natural incentives to innovate. Taking all this into account, any policy measure that restricts periphery-core migrations proves to be harmful in terms of steady-state growth. But not necessarily in terms of regional cohesion, since a higher catch-up potential may boost core-periphery divergence patterns.
Our theoretical results conform with Boldrin and Canova's empirics, but they are at odds with neoclassical views about the irrelevance of regional policies in the long run. On the other hand, our dual structure within the south di¤erentiates our conclusions from those of many divergence models: …rst, there is a trade-o¤ between long-run growth and core-periphery (instead of northsouth) cohesion; and secondly, unlike Puga (99) or Krugman and Livas Elizondo (96) , regional inequalities do not fade away as trade openness becomes almost perfect. This …nal di¤erence arises because trade-openness shocks are sectorally biased, acting as centripetal forces that drive economic activity towards the core.
In this model there is an interaction between an R&D sector, where patents are either copied or conceived, and a manufacturing sector whose varieties compete horizontally under monopolistic competition. The expected stream of pro…ts for those manufacturing varieties is equal in equilibrium to the corresponding value of the patent. Moreover, our locations -north, core and periphery-are institutionally distinct. This distinction justi…es, by assumption, two noticeable facts: …rms can not move from north to core (and viceversa); and patents can not be traded from north to core or viceversa either, because there are speci…c features in every location that can not be successfully replicated abroad.
We do next a comparison between 2 di¤erent steady states, each of which is characterized by a di¤erent level of trade openness for manufactures. In section 2 we derive the properties of a generic steady-state. Section 3 contains the comparative-statics exercise that reproduces our stylized facts.
Section 4 concludes.
The model without migration
As in Grossman and Helpman (91), we consider 2 countries -north and south -and the competitive interaction of …rms from both of them. One important novelty is the existence of a periphery within the south. Researchers from the core can only replicate northern patents to sell the corresponding products at lower cost, whereas the institutional atmosphere in the periphery impedes the production of manufactures. The competitive environment for industrial varieties shows horizontal di¤erentiation, monopolistic competition and no temporal obsolescence.
In the global economy there is a continuum of industrial varieties with measure n, and n = n c + n n (the addition of the measures from the north and the core). This degree of product variety expands over time due to innovation. Moreover, an increase in the local measure of manufactures enlarges the stock of public knowledge and reduces future R&D-costs. Grossman and Helpman's local stocks of knowledge are equal to n in the north -since all patents were originally made up there -and to n c in the core.
Then, by free entry in the innovative activity, the value of a patent is at most equal to the laborcost of its imitation (in the core) or of its creation (in the north). Given the linear speci…cation of the externality, that value decreases with the local stock of public knowledge in this way:
; with equality when _ n c > 0
v n aw n n ; with equality when _ n > 0
where am nc and a n stand for the number of researchers needed to imitate a northern patent in the core and to create a new variety in the north, respectively. Our variables w a ; w c and w n denote the nominal wage in the periphery, the core and the north, respectively. Later we will establish some necessary and su¢ cient parameter restrictions so that imitation and innovation coexist, which implies that
Aggregate populations in the north and the south (L n and L s ; respectively) are …xed by assumption, but there can be migrations within the same country. That means, in short, that Southerners can move from periphery to core (and viceversa) in response to economic-opportunity variables; i.e. 
W k t re ‡ects the discounted utility ‡ow that household k expects to obtain from period t onwards by acquiring manufactures (grouped into the composite X) and the homogeneous agricultural good (A). On the other hand, the particular form of U s reveals the relative weight assigned to food and manufactures in the following way:
The composite of manufactures X s is a Dixit and Stiglitz subutility function over the aggregate measure of varieties invented up to period s;
where 0< < 1 is a positive measure of the substitutability between manufactures and x j (s) quanti…es the household demand for variety j at time s; 8s t:
The production function for every particular manufacture and the primary good is identical and very simple: 1 unit of labor generates 1 unit of …nal output. Prior to the production of any manufacture it is necessary to incur a …xed cost (to buy, invent or imitate the corresponding patent), which is …nanced by means of gross savings. On the contrary, labor is the only factor in the production of food.
The function W k s is intertemporally maximized with respect to its ultimate arguments (x j (s); 8j; 8s t; A(s) 8s t) at every period t, taking as given the expected temporal paths v n (s) ; v c (s) ; n(s); p j (s) 8j and p a (s) ; 8s t: As Grossman and Helpman do, this problem can be decomposed into 2 parts: -The static allocation of a given per-household expenditure E k s among the primary good and all kind of manufactures, which gives rise to demand function for each of these commodities.
-The choice of an optimal path for E k s ; given the possibility of saving and investing in equity of southern and northern …rms.
Static optimization.
Let us denote by E the aggregate world expenditure and by the proportion of E spent by Northerners, which is an endogenous variable. The parameter 1 introduces the classical iceberg-notion of international trade costs: it is necessary to buy units of that good abroad to consume 1 unit at home. Considering that demand for any variety comes from both northern and southern consumers who face di¤erent c.i.f. prices, we can derive the aggregate demand for any northern (x n ) and southern manufacture (x c ), taking into account (5), (6) and our previous de…nition of as follows:
. In expressions (7) and (8), as in Martin and Ottaviano (99) 
is a measure of trade openness in the global economy with respect to manufactures:
Concerning …rms, they maximize pro…ts at any period s taking into account a demand of the type (7) or (8) and the simple production function described above. As a result, both utility and pro…t maximization from expressions (6), (7) and (8) result in a common optimal price for all industrial …rms in location k, which is a constant mark-up over marginal costs:
Then, from (9), per-period operating pro…ts for any manufacturing …rm in location k are
On the other hand, we assume that the wage di¤erential between north and core is high enough for southern imitators to quote the unconstrained optimal mark-up. Therefore, this wide-gap assumption will only be satis…ed if the original manufacturer can not undercut the southern …rm without incurring losses, i.e. i¤ w c w n
Given that the primary sector is characterized by perfect competition and free entry, the agricultural price is equal to the peripheral wage and per-…rm operating pro…ts are zero. We assume that international transaction costs for primary products remain unaltered. So, without loss of generality, we state that these costs are just nil. Taking all this into account,
2.2 Dynamic optimization: system of di¤erential equations.
Now we have to face the intertemporal allocation of expenditure and savings, not only to distribute consumption across the time horizon, but also to …nance new start-ups in the north and the core.
In the appendix we solve the general continuous-time optimization program for a representative household living in location k (k= north, core, periphery).
Moreover, we must follow the evolution of the aggregate measure of manufactures in the core and the global economy (
_ n n ) by looking at the labor-market-clearing conditions. These equilibrium conditions in the core and the north can be speci…ed considering the available production function and the technology in the imitation and innovation processes:
An important point in Grossman and Helpman (91) is the choice of a numeraire to evaluate wages and prices at any moment in time. We follow their normalization and take current aggregate expenditure as the numeraire:
This implies that all wages and prices are always measured in units of current aggregate expenditure.
Our de…nition of steady state is made explicit in three di¤erential equations (see the appendix).
If we combine these 3 di¤erential equations with expressions (3) and (15), we can rede…ne our steady state as a situation in which the values of w n ; w c and c= n nc remain stable, i.e. our system of di¤erential equations becomes
2.3 Steady state without migration.
If we could prove that there are some values c*, w n * and w c * for which°c=°w c =°w n = 0, this would imply that there exists a steady state for our system of di¤erential equations established in (16), (17) and (18). From (17) ; in our candidate to steady state
and from (13), (18) and (19) g =°n n =°n
We can observe that our innovation growth rate is exclusively determined by the monopoly power, the discount rate and the imitation capacity of the core.
Therefore, from (13) and (20),°v
Now, from equations (15), (21) and also the arbitrage condition (50) in the appendix, we are ready to obtain reduced-form equations for the pro…ts of any northern and southern industrial …rm: 
As a consequence, from (3), (10), (14), (22) and (23), we can restate the arbitrage condition corresponding to northern manufactures as follows:
By combining (20) and (24), we can already derive a formal expression for the steady-state imitation rate m: 
As could be expected, m rises with the imitation potential of the core relative to the northern innovation capacity:
Lc am
Ln a
: We can already establish a …rst set of parameter restrictions so that the global economy exhibits a positive innovation rate and a positive measure of manufactures operate in both countries. That is, we want that 0< c < 1, which requires 0< m < 1 and 0< g < 1: As we prove in the appendix, this initial condition can be simply summarized as follows:
2.4 Steady-state absolute and relative wages.
There are still several endogenous variables to be determined that are crucial for our comparativestatics exercise. Two of them are the relative wage of the core with respect to the north (! = wc wn ) and : From equations (7), (8), (9), (13), (14) and (15), we can get an idea of the determinants of ! as follows:
where
We can see from the left-hand side of (27) that only the supply-side fundamentals -i.e. industrial workforces in both countries and innovation and imitation long-term capacities -can modify xn xc : That means that any variation in international trade openness ( ) will be exactly o¤set in the long run by a countervailing adjustment of !:
Our term C( ; L c ; !) is a direct measure of the home-market advantage of one of the countries to o¤er higher wages for similar supply-side fundamentals. The country with a higher demand capacity (i.e. the north if > 1=2) will be able to reward better the labor force, since less demand will be wasted paying transaction costs there. Before we explore the relative-wage consequences of a rise in , we need to express in terms of the parameters for a steady-state situation. Next lemma will be of considerable help.
Lemma 1 :
In any steady state without net migratory ‡ows, any household's expenditure is identical to that household's income period by period. Therefore, the steady-state aggregate northern and southern incomes are equal to and 1-, respectively, and there are no net savings.
Proof. See appendix.
Subsequently, let us derive some formal expressions of northern and southern aggregate income.
From (12), (15), (72) and our de…nition of it is possible to come out with a neat expression of this variable as a fraction between zero and one:
In the denominator of (29), w n is an endogenous variable that has not been fully speci…ed yet in terms of the parameters: So, we need to obtain an expression for local absolute wages as well. Let's de…ne …rst
Now, if we plug (7) into (14), divide numerator and denominator of the latter expression by wn 1 2 and rearrange, eventually we …nd that
Proceeding in a similar way, we can solve for w c from (13) as follows:
Now we can really derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition for an increase in ! in response to a marginal rise in trade openness ( ) : In order to provide a benchmark that discloses the main determinants of convergence, we start adopting an extreme assumption: the imitation capacity of the core and its share in the aggregate measure of manufactures is in…nitesimal. That means that
We also adopt the following simplifying assumptions concerning the distribution of …nancial wealth:
where kl is equal to the proportion of aggregate wealth from location k owned by any household living in location l. That is, although people own some shares of foreign equity, the aggregate magnitude of those shares is negligible. We can argue that very small international capital movements su¢ ce to preserve the arbitrage condition (22).
Proposition 1:
Proof. Let's rewrite the second part of expression (27) as follows:
After a marginal increase in ; the right-hand side of (27) has to remain constant, because nothing is altered in the left-hand side of the equality. Therefore,
Then, if we take logs of (34) and compute the total derivative, we can get that
From (35) and (36),
In order to determine the sign of lim Lc!am 
Since the denominator of (40) is positive,
Next, from (29) and (31) we can obtain that
Now, if we plug (42) into (29), we can restate condition (41) only in terms of the parameters:
Finally, taking into account our assumptions in (33),
There are 2 opposite e¤ects of a reduction of international transaction costs on the relative wage !: The …rst one has to do with the di¤erence in aggregate income between north and south: a wealthier north will be likely to raise its demand for every southern manufacture beyond the increase in aggregate southern demand for any northern good. This would result in a rise of ! if there were no other active forces. Let's call this the relative-size e¤ect.
But there is still another e¤ect. Since most di¤erentiated products are initially produced in the north, the southern price-index will decrease sharply with a rise in ; whereas the northern one will remain almost unaltered. This phenomenon tends to reduce ! in steady state to keep Since we want to reproduce some stylized facts, it is convenient for us to rule out any price-index e¤ect threatening to abort north-south convergence. Then, the relative-size e¤ect will remain as the single driving force. Therefore, > 1=2 appears as a natural fact for a north-south structure that (together with ! 1 ) could be enough to achieve international convergence in per-capita income.
But let's provide …rst a su¢ cient condition for > 1=2 in terms of the parameters.
Lemma 2 :
Given our assumptions in (33),
The assumption made explicit in (11) involves that lim !1 (!) < , from which we can also derive the following lemma.
Lemma 3:
There exists a unique upper-bound L c L c such that the wide-gap assumption holds together with the coexistence of a positive measure of northern and southern manufactures; i.e. 9 a unique L c such that (11) and (26) are simultaneously satis…ed i¤
Our notion of steady state is partially characterized by the following equality:
where ! c = h(L a ) is our migration function, for which we adopt a convectional convex, downwardsloping shape (as in Faini (96)).
In this model we just take as given the main features of the migration function, but we will endogenously determine the curve ! c = f (L a ; ) : From (12), (20) and (32) we can obtain that 
Here we can appreciate the two basic e¤ects of a declining peripheral labor force (# L a ) on ! c : -First, the numerator and denominator of (45) directly capture the straightforward labor-supply e¤ ect: if new immigrants come from periphery to core, ! c will tend to decrease for a given value of Q.
-Secondly, the quotient Q(La; ) 1+Q(La; ) is decreasing in L a because it re ‡ects the gain in imitation potential of the core after an in ‡ow of former peripheral workers. This force tends to increase the fraction of the total measure of manufactures produced in the core, which channels world demand to this location and can potentially raise w c :
The relative strength of these two e¤ects varies along the relevant range of values of L a :
In fact, Q(L a ; ) acts as a positive measure of the imitation potential in the core. Moreover, additional migration reinforces much more that potential the lower Q(L a ; ) is.
In other words, once you have copied a high proportion of northern varieties, it is harder for you to raise your local wage by further imitating: you have to compete -every time more toughly -with more and more producers in your own location.
In fact, since by (45) f (0; ) = f L s a m Ln a ; = 0 8 and our function f is continuous in L a ;we know for sure that f (L a ; ) shows an inverted-U shape 8 . That is, we can observe both an upward-sloping part of the curve -where the labor-supply e¤ect is stronger -and a downward-sloping one, with a dominant imitation-potential e¤ect 6 (see …gure 1).
Main results.
Now we will obtain a su¢ cient condition for the ratio R ca = p er-capita incom e in the core p er-capita incom e in p eriphery to increase in response to a marginal rise in : 
With a sudden rise in , the dominance of the relative-size e¤ect -when we are close to full openness -weakens the home-market advantage of the north. The subsequent rise in ! c attracts a net migratory ‡ow from periphery to core and increases our southern imitation potential. Hence, the increase in c caused by migrations channels more world demand towards southern manufactures and exerts an upward pressure on the labor costs in the core. This force countervails the laborsupply e¤ect, which usually happens when industrial competition within the core is soft enough and southern labor force is su¢ ciently sticky.
Given the signi…cant agglomeration e¤ects on labor productivity detected in the EU by Ciccone (99), accepting that @f @La < 0 does nor seem counterfactual. Neither does the extreme stickiness of labor in many European countries (see Bentolila (99)). In that case, restraining migrations would be likely to mitigate core-periphery divergence, though at the expense of foregone growth-e¤ects in the global economy.
Let's try to face now the north-south convergence issue in a similar fashion. Proof. See appendix.
There are three forces involved in the comparative-statics evolution of relative north-south percapita income, two of which exactly o¤set each other. These 2 opposite forces, whose joint e¤ect is nil, can be described as follows:
-First, the net in ‡ow of workers to the core enhances the innovation rate and, consequently, also the demand for labor in the north, which tends to raise w n :
-At the same time, although the global economy innovates faster, a higher imitation potential raises the proportion of southern manufactures. Hence, a lower proportion of total …nancial wealth owned by the Northerners exactly makes up for the higher demand for researchers in that country.
Therefore, the only e¤ect capable of modifying comes from the aggregate demand for manufactures produced in the north. This aggregate demand goes down in terms of our numeraire, since the northern home-market advantage weakens.
Corollary:
Proof. Straightforward from the last 2 propositions.
Conclusions.
We have studied a north-south endogenous growth model where exogenous institutional features play a major role: they determine the relative incidence of a biased shock in trade openness on 2 distinct southern regions. Within our southern country, we have considered a perfectly-competitive market structure for the periphery together with some sources of agglomeration economies in the core. As a result, we have reproduced our stylized facts, i.e. the coexistence of per-capita income convergence between countries and divergence within the same countries.
The existence of scale e¤ects generates a trade-o¤ between core-periphery convergence and global steady-state growth. But not necessarily a trade-o¤ between long-run growth rates and north-south convergence.
We conclude that, no matter how generous interregional transfers are, if they do not help transform peripheral productive structures they can not prevent an asymmetric exposure to trade shocks.
If transfers also restrained migratory ‡ows, they could reduce the core-periphery gap, though only by lowering all Southerners'labor income.
On the other hand, if transfers helped to industrialize the periphery the scale-e¤ects would be larger. This looks an argument to advocate structural changes in the periphery as opposed to direct transfers to household consumption. But, in order to elaborate on this, we need to do some welfare analysis requiring transitional dynamics and an explicit formulation of both migratory and structural-change costs.
5 References. European Economic Review.
6 Appendix.
6.1 Household' s Intertemporal Optimization.
In order to allocate expenditure and savings over time, any household k must choose in every period s a variation in its portfolio composition, buying or selling equity from northern and southern …rms.
During that process we have to keep in mind that, in every period s, a fraction m = _ nc nn of the northern measure of varieties is copied by southern imitators.
Let n and c denote the current operating pro…ts of any northern and southern industrial …rm, respectively. At every period t, household k owns a measure nk (s) of northern …rms and ck (s) of southern …rms. Moreover, f nk stands for the proportion of gross-savings devoted to buying northern equity. We will explore the properties of an interior equilibrium in which new start-ups from both countries are …nanced (i.e. 0< f nk < 1).
Our control variables are E k (household's expenditure) and f nk (s) ; whereas the state variables are nk (s) and ck (s) : Then, the present-value Hamiltonian faced by any household in location k at time t for the period s is the following:
The …rst-order condition for an interior solution for f nk (s) is the following:
The …rst-order condition with respect to E k (s) yields, due to equation (48) ; that
And therefore, by di¤erentiating and using the …rst-order conditions with respect to the state vari-
Now, by grouping terms, we can de…ne A= E nvn and B= E ncvc . From (13), (14) and (50), it is possible to obtain a system of 3 di¤erential equations in A, B and c= n nc .Our steady state without migrations will be de…ned by equating these di¤erential equations to zero.
On the other hand, the system describes the dynamics of A, B and c, but the separate evolutions of E, v c and v n can not be disentangled. As a consequence, Grossman and Helpman have one degree of freedom to normalize E=1, which implies (by equation (3)
From the last expression and the de…nitions of A, B and c above, we could specify before the wage dynamics in (16) and (17). Consequently, by (16), (20), (51) and our de…nition of steady state,
Finally, solving for c in (52) we can get that
The trivial fact that n n c ; i.e. c 1, imposes our restriction (26) on the value of the parameters.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. From our de…nition of R ca ; assumption (33) and lemma 1 we can derive that in any steady
From (44), any marginal variation in must yield the following migratory reaction between steady states:
The assumptions of the proposition guarantee that the denominator in (55) is negative. As to the numerator, from (30) and (46) we can obtain that
and
Now, from (27) and (34) we can conclude that
After some computations, we can additionally get from Lemma 3 and (34) that
Finally, expressions (58) and (59) imply that
If we now go backwards, plugging (60) into (57) and then (57) into (56) (20),
we must obtain now the expressions for @Rca @!c and @Rca @La to clarify unambiguously which is the sign of (61). Then, from (33) and (54),
If we consider simultaneously (61) and (62), we can easily observe that
Finally, if we focus on the evolution of ! c , its total derivative can be proved to be positive provided that > 1=2 and 
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. Since L n and L s are invariant in our model, from Lemma 1 we can infer that
The easiest way to compute 
From (20), (25), (33) and (72)
; and by taking logs and
It is easy to show that, precisely,
and therefore, by (57), (60), (66) and (67),
Apart from the assumptions of this proposition, expressions (46) and (68) ensure that lim !1
6.4 Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Let nk = nk nn and ck = ck nc be the proportion of northern and southern equity, respectively, owned by a representative household living in location k, where nk and ck are the absolute measures of northern and southern …rms owned by that household. Then, the amount of gross savings for any household living in k can be expressed as follows:
We know that in our steady state = g 8j = north, core; 8k= north, core, periphery. Therefore,
where f nk is the proportion of total gross savings devoted to the purchase of northern equity. Then, from (70), (3) and (24), we can easily solve for GS k :
On the other hand, it is easy to see from (3) and (21) that the instantaneous variation in the value of previously-owned assets, considering also the e¤ect of imitation, is the following:
where V k is the value of previously-owned assets by a household in location k. Since, by (71) and the last equation; (Net Savings) k =GS k + @V k @t =0 8t in any steady state, any household's wealth is kept constant along the balanced growth path, i.e.
where y k is household k's income, 8k= north, core, periphery in steady state.
6.5 Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. From (29) we can check that
As we can conclude after inspecting expressions (20), (25), (31) and (32), condition lim !1 > 1=2
can only be satis…ed i¤ (73) holds. Now we just have to look for a su¢ cient condition that guarantees (73). From our de…nition of Q in expression (30), condition (73) can be restated as follows:
(1 )
By the assumptions established in this lemma, necessarily P 2 > 0: Let's now de…ne the function
It is easy to see that 
Since the equality H(L c ; L n ) = 0 contains an implicit functionL n (L c ) for which
is a monotone and continuous function in L n ; from (76) we can apply Bolzano's theorem to state that
Finally, from the sign of the partial derivatives above, we can say with certainty that
which means that Q < P and hence that lim !1 > 1=2:
6.6 Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. From (11) we can express the wide-gap assumption when ! 1 as 
Rearranging and rewriting (78) with an equality, we get the following quadratic equation in L c :
Since, from condition (26), L c > 0 and L n > a am L c a (1 ) ; we can conclude that the denominator of the right-hand side of (79) is bigger than 1. This means that at least one root L c1 of (79) If we formally restate (78) we can obtain the following inequality:
We can see that, in principle, the signs of E and F are undetermined but that of G is clearly negative, which implies that Z(0) < 0. Let's explore now the implications of the 2 possibilities concerning the sign of A: It is possible to check that x j (s) : Individual demand for variety j at time s.
x n : Aggregate demand for any northern manufacture (variety).
x c : Aggregate demand for any variety produced in the core.
y k : Income of any household from location k (k =north, core, periphery).
: Proportion of aggregate consumption spent by Northerners.
Parameters and exogenous variables.
a m : Indicator of research costs of imitation in the core.
a : Indicator of research costs of innovation in the north.
: Positive measure of substitutability among varieties of manufactures. : Positive measure of international-trade costs (classical iceberg-notion).
: Relative weight assigned to manufactures in the felicity function.
